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WHELAN ASSOCIATES V. JASLOW DENTAL LABORATORY:
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR THE
STRUCTURE AND SEQUENCE OF
COMPUTER PROGRAMS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,' the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that copyright protection for computer pro-
grams extends to the structure, sequence and organization of the
program. This is a landmark decision because it grants copyright protec-
tion beyond the source and object code2 of a program, and allows a find-
ing of substantial similarity between two programs which lack
similarities between the source and object code. Further, this increase in
copyright protection for computer programs threatens the balance be-
tween rewarding authors for their original works and keeping ideas in the
public domain. This Note examines the extension of copyright protec-
tion beyond the literal elements of a program-the source and object
code-to its non-literal elements-structure, sequence and organization.
Additionally, an appropriate substantial similarity test for computer pro-
grams is considered. Finally, a new test for delineating idea from expres-
sion in computer programs is analyzed and refined.
II. TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
A group of sights and sounds produced by a computer may be ac-
complished through an infinite number of completely different pro-
grams.3 Just as a love story may be written in many different ways, a
computer may be instructed to perform a specific task through an almost
1. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
2. See infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of source code. See infra
notes 16-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of object code.
3. "[M]any different computer programs can produce the same 'results,' whether those
results are an analysis of financial records or a sequence of images or sounds." Stem Elecs.,
Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982). In Stern, the defendant sold a video game
which was "virtually identical in both sight and sound" to the plaintiff's video game. Id. The
defendant contended that only the computer program which produced the sights and sounds,
and not the sights and sounds themselves, could be copyrighted. Id. The Second Circuit rec-
ognized that different programs had the capability of producing identical results. Id. Based on
that recognition, the court dismissed the defendant's argument because the defendant's reason-
ing would not prevent a competitor from "replicat[ing] precisely the sights and sounds of
[plaintiff's] audiovisual display" through a completely different program. Id.
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infinite variety of programs.4 Consequently, it is virtually impossible for
two programmers to independently create programs which instruct the
computer in identical or nearly identical ways.5
When a programmer begins to write a program, he or she must first
"develop a generalized statement of the task to be performed."6 The
programmer must have a "complete understanding of the [task] and a
complete general plan of attack" before starting to write a program.7 To
form a plan of attack, the programmer translates a general idea into a
concrete statement of the functions which will be included in the pro-
gram. For example, a general idea for a program would be a program to
store student test scores, calculate a student's total score for all tests
given and calculate a mean score for each individual test. The plan of
attack for this program would be a function to input the scores, a func-
tion to calculate a total score and a function to calculate the mean score
for each test.
After a programmer forms a plan of attack, he or she breaks the
statement down "into ever smaller and smaller [sections or modules] that
can be quantified and stated in algebraic and logical notation."' In the
4. At the hearings for the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copy-
righted Works, Commissioner Arthur Miller introduced the concept of an infinite variety of
ways to write both plays and programs. NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 20 (1978). The Commissioner questioned
Dan McCracken, vice-president of the Association for Computing Machinery:
Commissioner Miller: How many ways are there to produce a program ... ?
Dan McCracken... :" An infinite number in principle, and in practice dozens,
hundreds.
Miller: So it is comparable to the theoretically infinite number of ways of writ-
ing Hamlet?
McCracken: I belive so.
Id. (quoting NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
TRANSCRIPT MEETING No. 10, 44-45 (1978)).
5. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1244 n.45 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987) (court noted that "[d]ifferent program codes in differ-
ent computer languages are capable of producing identical screen outputs").
See also Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983). In Strohon,
defendant's enhancement kit was substituted for five of plaintiff's ROMs which controlled the
video game, PAC-MAN. Id. at 744. The district court stated, "the uncontradicted expert
testimony at the hearing was that there is virtually an infinite number of ways to write a set of
program instructions that will produce the PAC-MAN game sequencing." Id. at 753. Based
on this finding, the court held that the "high degree of identity of the two programs" com-
pelled a holding of substantial similarity and copyright infringement. Id.
6. J. LAUTSCH, AMERICAN STANDARD HANDBOOK OF SOFTWARE BUSINESS LAW 28
(1985).
7. H. LEDGARD, P. NAGIN & J. HUERAS, PASCAL WITH STYLE: PROGRAMMING PROV-
ERBS 71 (1979).
8. J. LAUTSCH, supra note 6, at 29 (emphasis in original).
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above example, the function to calculate the mean score for a test would
be reduced to modules that would:
1. Store that number.
2. Add together the students' scores.
3. Divide the total by the number of students.
Each section or module will perform a specific task.9 This process results
in module descriptions which can be converted into the instructions that
the computer will execute.' 0
The conversion process is called encoding and results in computer
instructions called source code." "Source code usually is written in a
'high-level' computer language, meaning one that is similar to
English."12
The code is then tested and debugged,' 3 a procedure which elimi-
nates the errors in the program. Most errors occur in one of two ways.
First, an error may be a syntax error. 14  Computer programming lan-
guage syntax is synonymous with grammar. When an instruction vio-
lates the syntax rules, the instruction contains a syntax error.' 5 Second,
an error may occur in the programmer's logic. The computer executes
9. Conley & Bryan, A Unifying Theory for the Litigation of Computer Software Copyright
Cases, 6 COMPUTER L.J. 55, 57 (1985).
10. Note, The Future of Copyright Protection and Computer Programs-Beyond Apple v.
Franklin, 13 N. KY. L. REV. 97, 104 (1986).
11. Conley & Bryan, supra note 9, at 58.
12. Id. Examples of high-level programming languages include FORTRAN (FORmula
TRANslation), BASIC (Beginner's All-purpose Symbolic Instruction Code), EDL (Event
Driven Language) and APL (A Programming Language). Id. Most computer programs are
written in high-level programming languages. The resulting code is called source code.
Gesmer, Developments in the Law of Computer Software Copyright Infringement, Spring
JURIMETRICS J. 224, 224 (1986). High-level programming languages "differ in their degree of
closeness to natural or mathematical language .... They differ also in the type of problem for
which they are best suited." A. AHO & J. ULLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF COMPILER DESIGN 26
(1977).
When encoded into a programming language called BASIC, the mean calculating module
discussed in the text looks like this:
Dim Scores (30)
TotalStudent = 30
TotalScores - 0
For I = 1 to TotalStudent
TotalScores = TotalScores + Scores(I)
Next I
Mean = TotalScores/TotalStudents
13. Note, supra note 10, at 104.
14. Each programming language has rules which dictate the form of the instruction the
computer will execute. Language syntax is a set of rules which determines whether an instruc-
tion is valid. A. AHO & J. ULLMAN, supra note 12, at 28.
15. Id.
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instructions in the order they are presented. A logic error occurs when
program code is not written in a logical order. For example, if the in-
struction to print an answer appears before the instruction to calculate
the answer, the program contains a logic error.
Finally, the program must be translated from the source code,
which is easily understood by the programmer, into a series of coded
binary numbers, e.g., numbers which consist of only ones and zeros,
which a computer can execute.16 The resulting code is called object
code. 17
Once a program is written, it may be stored in many different
ways. 18 Programs, in computer-readable form, are a series of electronic
impulses. 9 These signals may be stored in the internal memory of the
computer, called RAM (Random Acesss Memory),2 ° on floppy disks21 or
hard disks.22 Magnetic tapes, punch cards and computer chips are other
methods of storage.23 One common type of computer chip is a ROM
(Read Only Memory) chip which permanently stores coded electronic
16. 1. LAUTSCH, supra note 6, at 40.
17. The translation process is accomplished by using either a compiler or assembler.
Object code is derived from source code by means of an automatic process, per-
formed by a computer under the control of a program called a "compiler," which
converts the source code into object code. Object code, which may be executed di-
rectly by a computer, bears no resemblance to English and is extremely difficult to
comprehend.
Gesmer, supra note 12, at 225 n.2.
18. J. LAUTSCH, supra note 6, at 50.
19. Id. at 45.
20. RAM is an internal memory storage device that holds data in such a way that an item
may be retrieved at any time regardless of its storage location. The RAM stores data like a
phonograph record. The interaction between the computer and the RAM is similar to the
interaction between a record player and the record. A record player can play any song (on one
side of the record) at any time as directed. Conversely, a tape player must access songs sequen-
tially from a cassette tape. R. HIPGRAVE, COMPUTING TERMS AND ACRONYMs: A DICTION-
ARY 91 (1985).
21. A floppy disk is a small flexible magnetic disk surrounded by a protective jacket which
stores data and computer programs. Standard disks are five and one-quarter inches in diame-
ter. Id. at 49.
22. J. LAUTSCH, supra note 6, at 12. A hard disk is an inflexible magnetic disk which can
store considerably more data and may be accessed faster by the computer than a floppy disk.
R. HiPGRAVE, supra note 20, at 53.
23. J. LAUTSCH, supra note 6, at 50.
A magnetic tape stores data on a plastic tape coated with magnetic particles. The average
size tape is 2400 feet long, one-half inch wide and is wound on a reel. Magnetic tape is ac-
cessed sequentially. R. HIPGRAVE, supra note 20, at 70-71. See supra note 20 for a discussion
of RAM, which may be accessed randomly.
A punch card is a thin card on which data is stored by punching holes in designated
positions on the card. R. HIPGRAVE, supra note 20, at 20. Punch cards are not favored by
most computer programmers because it is easy to mix up the order of the cards.
WHELAN ASSO CIA TES
impulses on thin layers of silicon.24
III. COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Overview
Article I, section eight, clause eight of the United States Constitu-
tion provides that Congress has the power "[tlo promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies."25 The Copyright Act26 derives from this grant of power. The
Copyright Act protects "original works of authorship fixed in any tangi-
ble medium of expression.., from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device."'27 The Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act) and
its 1980 amendments specifically protect computer programs.28
Sections 106(1) and (2) of the Copyright Act give a copyright owner
the exclusive right to "reproduce the copyrighted work in copies" and to
"prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work."2 9 Further,
section 101 defines a derivative work as "a work based upon one or more
existing works ... [in any form] in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted."' Therefore, the Copyright Act protects the copy-
right owner's interest in controlling the copying of his or her work, as
well as the creation of works derived from his or her copyrighted work.
Copyright protection not only protects the author from exact repli-
cation of his or her work, such as an exact duplicate of a computer disk
24. J. LAUTSCH, supra note 6, at 46-48.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). This section of the Copyright Act lists the following cate-
gories as works of authorship: "(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompa-
nying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and
other audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings." Id.
The requirement that a work must be fixed in a tangible medium of expression is satisfied
without regard for the "form, manner, or medium of fixation" as long as the "words, numbers,
notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic indicia" may be perceived by a
machine or device. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5665.
28. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5664; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 50-51 (1975). See also
Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 117 (1982)).
29. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (2) (1982).
30. Id. § 101.
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onto another disk, but also copying into a different medium.3' Just as
copying a sketch or drawing from gift wrapping paper onto fabric consti-
tutes an infringement of the design's copyright,32 the process of transfer-
ring a computer program from a disk to the computer's memory is also a
copyright infringement.33 Further, exact duplication is not necessary for
copying. The Copyright Act also protects "the various modes in which
the matter of any work may be adopted, imitated, transferred, or repro-
duced. ... .,,3' The breadth of this definition of protected works has led
to voluminous case law defining the similarity necessary between two
nonduplicate works to constitute copying.35
31. In Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981),
defendant contended that computer programs stored on Read Only Memory chips (ROMs)
were not copies of the original programs, and therefore a ROM chip which is a copy of another
ROM chip does not infringe the copyright protection of the original program. Id. at 173. In
an alternate holding, the district court held that the program imprinted on the ROM chip was
a copy of the program, and any duplication of plaintiff's program on defendant's ROM chip
was a copyright infringement. Id. at 175. See also 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.01[B]
(1986) (hereinafter NIMMER).
32. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982).
33. The report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU) stated that "the placement of a work into a computer is the preparation of a
copy .... ." NAT'L COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT 13 (1978). Therefore, § 117(1) includes a privilege which allows the owner of
a computer program to make a copy of his program when it is an "essential step in the utiliza-
tion of the computer program in conjunction with a machine," e.g., when the program is
executed by the computer. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (West Supp. 1986). See infra text accompany-
ing note 106. See 2 NIMMER, supra note 31, § 8.08 for a further discussion of reproduction
rights and computer uses.
34. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1947).
35. Section 102 of the Copyright Act specifies that copyright protection extends to: "liter-
ary works ... musical works.., dramatic works.., pantomimes and choreographic works...
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works... motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
... sound recordings." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
Some of the earliest copyright cases evaluated infringement actions concerning nondupli-
cate copying of plays, books, music, lamps and statuettes.
In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954), plaintiffs created
statuettes made of semivitreous china which they sold as statuettes and for use as lamp bases,
Id. at 202. Defendants copied plaintiff's statuettes and also used them as lamp bases. Id. at
203. The Supreme Court held that the statutettes were works of art, and therefore protected
under copyright law. Id. at 213-14.
In Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), although the Supreme Court acknowledged plain-
tiff's copyright protection for his accounting book, the Court found that "the ruled lines and
headings of accounts must necessarily be used as incident to [the accounting system]." Id. at
104. The Court concluded that the blank pages were not copyrightable, and therefore defend-
ant's duplication of the lines and headings did not constitute an infringement. Id. at 107. See
infra note 232-35 and accompanying text for an analysis of Baker by the Third Circuit in
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 877 (1987).
In Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), plaintiff alleged that defendant in-
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When a copyright owner feels that his or her copyrighted work has
been copied, he or she may bring an infringement suit in federal court.36
To prove copyright infringement, "a plaintiff must prove ownership in
the copyright and 'copying' by the defendant., 37 Ownership of the copy-
right may be shown through a registration certificate.38 In the absence of
direct evidence of copying, even when the defendant's work is an exact
duplicate, a plaintiff must show "evidence of access to the copyrighted
work and substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and the
defendant's work."'39 Access to the copyrighted work may be proven by
direct evidence or inferred from similarities in the two works which "pre-
clude the possibility that the defendant independently arrived at the same
result."' Therefore, the essential element in a copyright infringement
fringed plaintiff's copyrighted musical compositions, The Lord Is My Shepard and A Mother's
Prayer. Id. at 467. After the Second Circuit listened to the works, the court determined that
the similarities were sufficient to warrant a finding of fact by the jury "that the similarities did
not result from coincidence." Id. at 469. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the substantial similarity test applied by the Arnstein court.
In Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669
(1936), both plaintiff's play and defendant's movie were based on the true story of a Scotch
girl. Id. at 49. The court measured similarities in settings, character traits, such as social class
and "waywardness," and scenes. Id. at 54-55. Although the dialogue of the defendant's movie
was not compared to the dialogue of the plaintiff's play, the court held that "a play may be
pirated without using the dialogue." Id. at 55.
In Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902
(1931), the plaintiff owned a copyright in the play Abie's Irish Rose, a story of a "religious
zealot who insists upon his child's marrying no one outside his faith; opposed by another who
is in this respect just like him, and his foil. Their difference in race is merely an obbligato to
the main theme, religion." Id. at 120, 121-22. In the defendant's motion picture, The Cohens
and The Kellys, "zealotry is wholly absent; religion does not even appear.... The only matter
common to the two [works] is a quarrel between a Jewish and an Irish father, the marriage of
the children, the birth of grandchildren and a reconciliation." Id. at 120, 122. The court did
not find a copyright infringement. Id. at 122.
In Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926), the Second Circuit stated that "copying
which is an infringement must be something 'which ordinary observation would cause to be
recognized as having been taken from' the work of another." Id. at 692 (quoting King Syndi-
cate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (1924)).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction
over any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, copyrights and
trade-marks." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982).
37. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1161 (9th
Cir. 1977). Plaintiffs, Sid and Marty Krofft, created the television show H.R. Pufilstuf. De-
fendant's McDonaldland television commericals infringed plaintiff's copyright in the television
show. Id. at 1167.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982).
39. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162.
40. 3 NIMMER, supra note 31, § 13.02[B] (citations omitted). "If evidence of access is
absent, the similarities must be so striking as to preclude the possibility the plaintiff and de-
fendant independently arrived at the same result." Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d
Cir. 1946). The "striking similarity" test used to infer access is a separate test from the "sub-
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suit is the proof of substantial similarity in the copyrightable portions of
plaintiff's and defendant's works.
The purpose of the copyright law is to foster creativity through "as-
suring the author of an original work the exclusive benefits of whatever
commercial success his or her work enjoys .... 41 However, if protec-
tion of original works is too broad, creativity will be deterred when "au-
thors are fearful that their creations will too readily be found to be
substantially similar to preexisting works."'4 To balance these interests,
copyright protection is limited to the particular expression of the idea.
The idea itself is never protected. 3
The distinction between idea and expression determines the copy-
rightable aspects of an original work. Therefore, a court must first distin-
guish the idea from the expression of a work. The courts in Baker v.
Selden '4 and Nichols v. Universal Pictures4 5 articulated tests to delineate
between idea and expression.4 6 However, these tests alone are not suffi-
cient to establish copying. A second test must be applied to establish
substantial similarity. The second test must focus on similarities in both
ideas and expressions. Thus, substantial similarity of the ideas of two
works cannot alone establish copying because ideas are not copyright-
stantial similarity" test described in this Note. For a further discussion, see 3 NIMMER, supra
note 31, § 13.02.
41. Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983).
The balance between the interests of authors and the public was discussed in Miller v.
Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981). In Miller, the plaintiff contended that
research of factual matters was copyrightable. Id. at 1368. The Fifth Circuit noted that facts
are not subject to copyright protection. Id. at 1369. The court stated that "[t]here is no ra-
tional basis for distinguishing between facts and the research involved in obtaining facts." Id.
at 1372. Therefore, the court held that research was not entitled to copyright protection. Id.
The court reasoned that this holding was consistent with the "purpose and intended scope
of protection under copyright law." Id. at 1371. The court stated, "[t]he line drawn between
uncopyrightable facts and copyrightable expression of facts serves an important purpose in
copyright law. It provides a means of balancing the ... interest in stimulating creative activ-
ity, as embodied in the Copyright Clause, against the public's need for unrestrained access to
information." Id.
42. Warner Bros., 729 F.2d at 240.
43. Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 980 (1976). In that case, the plaintiffs, who owned the copyright to a children's book
entitled My Mother is the Most Beautiful Woman in the World, alleged that defendants in-
fringed plaintiff's copyright by publishing an illustrated story entitled The Most Beautiful Wo-
man in the World. Id. at 88-89. The Second Circuit stated that "[t]he two stories are not
similar in mood, details or characterization." Id. at 92. Therefore, the court held that there
had been no copyright infringement. Id. at 93.
44. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
45. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
46. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the test articulated in
Baker; see infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of Nichols.
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able. Instead, copying of nonduplicate works is only established when
both the ideas and the expressions of the works are substantially
similar.47
B. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Substantial Similarity Tests
The distinction between the idea and the protectible expression is
difficult to generalize.48 Judge Learned Hand explained in Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.49 that "no principle can be stated as
to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has bor-
rowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore, inevitably be ad hoc."5
1. Delineating idea from expression
Many courts have attempted to formulate tests to distinguish idea
from expression. In Baker v. Selden,51 the Supreme Court stated that
while it is clear that a book may be subject to copyright protection, the
idea it illustrates may not be copyrighted 2.5  Therefore, a court must dis-
tinguish the idea from the expression describing the idea. The Baker
Court held that the headings and columns on blank pages of a book
describing a system of bookkeeping were methods of operation of the
art. 3 "[W]here the [idea of the work] cannot be used without employing
the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the [work]," the Court
stated, "such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary
incidents to the [idea]" and are not protected under copyright law.
54
A second idea/expression test was formulated in Nichols v. Univer-
sal Pictures.5 To draw a line between idea and expression, Judge
47. The courts in Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976), Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir.
1970) and Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982), have created tests to evaluate substantial similarity.
48. Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 980 (1976). The court in Reyher found that the defendant "borrowed the 'idea' embodied
in the story from her mother," yet the "presentation of the story line was entirely her own."
Id. at 90. The defendant's story was based on a Russian folk tale told to her by her mother.
Id. at 89. The defendant could not recall the exact story she had been told, and therefore, she
wrote her own story. Id. at 90.
49. 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960) (court upheld ruling that defendants infringed plaintiff's
copyright in ornamental design used in creation of printed cloth).
50. Id. at 489 (emphasis in original).
51. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
52. Id. at 102.
53. Id. at 101, 103.
54. Id. at 103.
55. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). In Nichols, the Second
Circuit stated that "while we are as aware as any one that the line [between idea and expres-
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Learned Hand in Nichols formulated the following "abstractions test":
[U]pon any work... a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident
is left out .... [B]ut there is a point in this series of abstractions
where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the [au-
thor] could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from
their expression, his property is never extended. 6
2. Substantial similarity tests
Once the expression of the work has been defined, a court must use a
substantial similarity test to determine copyright infringement. The Sec-
ond, Seventh and Ninth circuits have each developed substantial similar-
ity tests. The Second Circuit, in Reyher v. Children's Television
Workshop,57 restated Learned Hand's "abstractions test." 8 The court
stated, "the essence of infringement lies in taking not a general theme but
its particular expression through similarities of treatment, details, scenes,
events and characterization."59 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit test of sub-
stantial similarity of expression described in Roth Greeting Cards v.
United Card Co.,60 compares the "total concept and feel" of the defend-
ant's and plaintiff's works to measure similarity.6 Finally, in Atari, Inc.
sion], wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary, that is no excuse for not drawing it; it is a
question such as courts must answer in nearly all cases." Id. at 122. See supra note 35.
56. Id. at 121. Learned Hand began applying the abstractions test with a detailed descrip-
tion of the two scripts. Next, Judge Hand analyzed the plays by removing details, incidents
and character traits, thereby creating more abstract descriptions of the scripts, until he arrived
at an abstract description of plaintiff's play which matched an equally abstract description of
defendant's play. Id. at 120-22. As his most abstract description of the plays, Judge Hand
characterized the idea of the two plays as "[a] comedy based upon conflicts between Irish and
Jews, into which the marriage of their children enters ... ." Id. at 122. The Second Circuit
held that despite similarities between the theme and characters of the works, plaintiff's theme
and stock characters were too abstract to warrant copyright protection. Id. at 122-23. See
supra note 35 for a further description of the two works.
57. 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). See supra note 48.
58. Reyher, 533 F.2d at 91. Judge Learned Hand first enunciated his "abstractions test" in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). In
Nichols, he noted,
[u]pon any work ...a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out .... [Tlhere is a point in
this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the
playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expres-
sion, his property is never extended.
Id. at 121.
59. Rehyer, 533 F.2d at 91.
60. 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
61. Id. at 1110.
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v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics,62 the Seventh Circuit
stated that, "the test is whether the accused work is so similar to the
plaintiff's work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that
the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's protectible expres-
sion by taking material of substance and value."' 63 The variety of tests
demonstrates the inherent difficulties that courts face in evaluating sub-
stantial similarity in copyright infringement actions.
64
3. Application of the substantial similarity test
In applying a substantial similarity test, the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits have focused on two issues: 1) similarity of ideas; and 2) misappro-
priation of expression. 65  Further, the standard for establishing
substantial similarity varies with the idea expressed.66 When an idea
may be expressed through many different expressions, substantial simi-
larity may be established through similarities which fall short of close
paraphrase.67 Conversely, when the idea may only be expressed in a lim-
ited number of ways, copyright protection for the expression of the idea
will be limited.68 When copyright protection is limited, substantial simi-
larity may only be established through virtually identical expressions.
Finally, expression which is indispensable in the treatment of an idea is
given no copyright protection. Similarity of uncopyrightable expression
does not establish substantial similarity.6 9
62. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (defendant's K.C. Munchkin
video game with "gobblers" and "ghost monsters" held substantially similar to plaintiff's
PAC-MAN game).
63. Id. at 614.
64. The Second Circuit in Reyher literally focused on the similarities in specific elements of
the work, such as scenes and characterization. Reyher, 533 F.2d at 91. However, in Reyher,
when the court was unable to apply a "pattern analysis" test because children's stories lack
complexity of characterization and scenes, the court was forced to compare the "total concept
and feel" of the two works, as dictated by the Ninth Circuit's test in Roth. Id. Similarly, the
"pattern analysis" test was inapplicable in analyzing similarities of video game characters as
described in Atari, 672 F.2d 607. The Atari test measuring appropriations of materials of
substance and value is merely a third attempt to formulate a distinction between idea and
expression. Id. at 614-15. See text accompanying note 59 for a statement of the test in Reyher;
see text accompanying note 61 for a statement of the Roth test; see supra note 43 for a descrip-
tion of the children's stories in Roth; see supra note 62 for a discussion of Atari.
65. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); Sid & Marty Kroffit Television Prods.
v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
66. See infra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
67. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984). See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
68. Id. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
69. Id. at 489. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
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In Arnstein v. Porter,7" the Second Circuit stated that "two separate
elements [are] essential" in a copyright infringement suit: "(a) that de-
fendant copied from plaintiff's copyrighted work and (b) that the copy-
ing (assuming it to be proved) went so far as to constitute improper
appropriation."71
The Ninth Circuit in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v.
McDonald's Corp.7 modified the Arnstein test and renamed the two ele-
ments as an "intrinsic test" and an "extrinsic test."73 The Krofft court
stated that an "extrinsic test" examines the substantial similarity between
the ideas of the two works.74 This test admits expert testimony to aid the
trier of fact.75 The "intrinsic test" determines whether the copy consti-
tutes an improper misappropriation.76 This test examines the similarities
between the expression of the works.77 However, it does not admit any
expert testimony. Instead, it relies on the response of the ordinary lay
observer.7 8
The application of the Arnstein/Krofft test does not require proof of
exact duplication to establish an infringement. In Nichols, Judge
Learned Hand stated that the protection of literary property "cannot be
limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial
variations."7 9 However, where the idea and expression are inseparable,
broad protection may be limited.80 For example, the general idea of boy
70. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). See supra note 35.
71. Id. at 468.
72. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
73. Id. at 1164.
74. Id. The Arnstein court did not call this test an "extrinsic test." Arnstein, 154 F.2d at
468.
75. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The Arnstein court stated that "[i]f copying is established .... the test [for illicit
copying] is the response of the ordinary lay hearer" and expert testimony is irrelevant. Am-
stein, 154 F.2d at 468. In Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir.
1970), the Ninth Circuit did not use a bifurcated test. The court considered the work in its
entirety, rather than distinguishing the idea and expression. The court stated that " 'the test of
infringement is whether the work is recognizable by an ordinary observer as having been taken
from the copyrighted source.'" Id. at 1110 (quoting White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo
Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1907)). In contrast to the greeting cards considered in Roth, the complex-
ity of computer programs renders useless the response of the ordinary lay observer. See infra
text accompanying notes 124 and 141 for a discussion of this problem.
79. Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
902 (1931).
80. "Some ideas can be expressed in myriad ways, while others allow only a narrow range
of expression." Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 488. The Ninth Circuit stated that fictional ideas may
generally be expressed with "infinite variations in setting, sequence of incident, and characteri-
zation." Id. In contrast, factual works can only be expressed in a narrow range of ways. Id.
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meets girl may be expressed through many different expressions. When
an author does not express a broad idea through original expression, and
instead uses expression which is nearly identical to another author's ex-
pression, "[a] resemblance in details of setting, incident, or characteriza-
tion that falls short of close paraphrase may be enough to establish
substantial similarity and infringement."81
In contrast, some ideas, such as "the boy ran across the street" may
only be expressed in a limited number of ways. Subsequent expressions
of the idea will necessarily be substantially similar to the original expres-
sion.82 Consequently, when an idea may only be expressed in a limited
number of ways, "similarity of expression may have to amount to verba-
tim reproduction or very close paraphrasing before a ... work will be
deemed infringed.",
83
Similarly, copyright protection of historical works does not extend
to facts or explanatory hypotheses.84 In Echevarria v. Warner Brothers
Pictures,5 the court stated that "[o]ne cannot build a story around a
historical incident and then claim exclusive right to the use of the inci-
dent."86 If this were true, "all the novels, short stories, and dramas writ-
ten about the Civil War" would infringe upon the work of the first author
and cause him or her to claim an exclusive right to the incident.87 The
court held that if historical works were given broad protection, an author
would be granted a monopoly over historical facts.
88
A final example of how the standard establishing substantial similar-
ity varies with the idea expressed is the scenes afaire doctrine.89 Scenes a
faire are given no copyright protection. Scenes a faire are defined as
"'incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indis-
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
841 (1980). Hoehling involved three historical accounts of the events surrounding the Hinden-
burg. Although the court acknowledged the plaintiff's copyright in his book, it stated, "[t]o
avoid a chilling effect on authors who contemplate tackling an historical issue or event, broad
latitude must be granted to subsequent authors who make use of historical subject matter,
including theories or plots." Id. at 977, 978.
85. 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935).
86. Id. at 638.
87. Id.
88. "In works devoted to historical subjects... a second author may make significant use
of prior work, so long as he does not bodily appropriate the expression of another." Hoehling,
618 F.2d at 980.
89. Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 489.
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pensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic.' ,, 0
Under the scenes afaire doctrine, forms of expression that "flow[ ] neces-
sarily from common ... ideas" are not protectible.9 ' Therefore, a second
author may reproduce verbatim any expression which is standard or
stock in the treatment of an idea without infringing a copyright.92 To
hold otherwise would give an author a copyright in stock scenes and
grant a monopoly in commonplace ideas.93
C. Summary
Copyright law provides protection for original works of authorship.
However, protection is limited to the expression of the work and does not
extend to the idea. The circuit courts have developed two separate
prongs of analysis for use in copyright infringement actions. The first
prong, as exemplified by Hand's abstractions test in Nichols v. Universal
Pictures,94 distinguishes the idea from the expression of the work. 95 This
analysis determines the copyrightable elements of a work. The second
prong measures the substantial similarity of the works. The Reyher v.
Children's Television Workshop,96 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card
Co.97 and Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics98
tests each focus on general similarities between two works.99 Application
of the substantial similarity test as mandated by the courts in Arnstein v.
Porter"° and Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonald's
Corp. 101 requires a two-step evaluation of, first, the similarity of ideas,
and second, the similarity of expressions. 102
The degree of duplication or similarity necessary to prove infringe-
ment varies with the type of work before the court. Ideas which may
only be expressed in a limited number of ways require almost verbatim
90. Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 979 (quoting Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y.
1978)).
91. See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983) (court held that ten similarities
"follow obviously from the unprotected idea of a surprised understudy, and are therefore un-
protected 'scenes a faire' ").
92. Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 489.
93. Id.
94. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
95. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
96. 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
97. 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
98. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
99. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
100. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
101. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
102. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
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copying to establish infringement,1"3 while ideas which may be conveyed
through a broad range of expressions require less similarity between the
works to constitute copying." Scenes a faire are given no protection
because the available forms of expression are indispensable to the idea. 105
Although most members of the public are unfamiliar with computer
programs, the ordinary observer test has been used to evaluate similari-
ties between complex and highly technical programs. Only when the
complexity of computer programs has rendered useless the value of the
ordinary observer test have the courts modified the principles of copy-
right law developed in other areas.
IV. COMPUTER COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Overview
In 1974, Congress created the National Commission on New Tech-
nological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to "study and report on
the problems and issues of new technology and copyright." 10 6 In 1980,
Congress replaced section 117 of the Copyright Act with a new section
117 which codified the CONTU Report's recommendations without al-
teration.1 0 7 Based on the CONTU Report, Congress also added a defini-
tion of "computer program" to section 101 of the Copyright Act.l18
For the purposes of copyright protection, computer programs are
considered literary works.10 9 Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines
literary works as "works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regard-
less of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, man-
uscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are
embodied." 110
103. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 81 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
106. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1240 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
107. Id. at 1241. Section 117 allows the user of a computer program to make copies of the
program when the new copy or adaptation is necessary for use with a machine or for archival
purposes. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (West Supp. 1986). See supra note 33.
108. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1241. Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines "computer pro-
gram" as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (West Supp. 1986).
109. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5667. The report states that " 'literary works'... includes.., computer
programs." Id.
110. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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B. Copyrightability of Computer Programs
Judicial decisions have extended copyright protection to computer
programs regardless of their form or embodiment. In Williams Electron-
ics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc., 1 the Third Circuit stated that the
1980 amendments to the Copyright Act firmly established the copyright-
ability of computer programs.1 2 The court further stated that copyright
protection extends to source code, object code and object code stored on
a Read Only Memory Chip (ROM).13
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,14 the Third
Circuit affirmed its decision in Williams," 5 and held that computer pro-
grams which coordinate the internal functions of a computer, called op-
erating systems, are protected under copyright law." 6 In Franklin,
defendants argued that an operating system is either a " 'process', 'sys-
tem', or 'method of operation' and hence" excluded from copyright pro-
tection under section 102(b) of the Copyright Act.' 7 Defendants noted
that these areas are not eligible for copyright protection.' 18 In response,
the court observed that defendants had conceded that application pro-
grams are copyrightable.119 The court also commented that both operat-
ing systems and application programs "instruct the computer to do
something."1 20 Therefore, the court concluded that for the purpose of
the Copyright Act, both operating systems and application programs are
111. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982). In Williams, plaintiffs manufactured and sold an elec-
tronic video game called DEFENDER. Id. at 872. The computer program, which controlled
the sights and sounds of DEFENDER, was stored on a ROM chip. Id. Defendants sold
electronic components for video games. Id. Among defendant's sales were ROMs which con-
tained a program virtually identical to plaintiff's DEFENDER game. Id. See supra note 31
and accompanying text for a discussion of ROM chips.
112. Id. at 875.
113. Id. at 876-77. The court rejected defendant's contention that a copy must be intelligi-
ble to humans to be protected under the Copyright Act. This reasoning would not protect
object code stored on ROMs. Id. The court emphasized that § 101 of the Copyright Act
extends protection "to include a material object in which a work is fixed 'by any method,...
and from which the work can be perceived . .. either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.'" Id. at 877 (emphasis in original) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
114. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
115. Id. at 1248-49.
116. Id. at 1252.
117. Id. at 1250. Section 102 of the Copyright Act states that "[iun no case does copyright
protection ... extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, [or] method of operation ...
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
118. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1251.
119. Id. Application programs are programs such as a computer assisted tax return pro-
gram. Id.
120. .d.
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appropriate subjects for copyright protection.'21
C. Substantial Similarity
The first cases involving computer program copyright infringement
almost all involved an exact copy of the copyrighted work. For example,
in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,122 defendants' pro-
grams were virtually identical to the copyrighted works, and defendants
did not dispute that they copied plaintiff's programs. 123 However, even
where exact copying can be shown, the plaintiff must establish a substan-
tial similarity between the two programs. 124 To establish substantial sim-
ilarity, a plaintiff must first delineate the idea from the expression of the
program, 125 and then prove substantial similarity between both the ideas
and expressions of the works. 126 This test is difficult when dealing with
computer programs because the highly technical nature of computer pro-
grams makes line by line comparisons nearly impossible.
127
The initial problem of distinguishing idea from expression is ampli-
fied with computer programs because many programming structures or-
ganize data. These structures create specified memory locations where
data is stored and retrieved.'28 As such, these programming structures
121. Id.
122. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
123. Id. at 1245. See also, Data Cash Sys. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 628 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th
Cir. 1980); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 777 (C.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
124. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
127. Computer programs involve many lines of code comprised of variables, programming
terms and directions to the computer. Two programs can produce the exact same output, yet a
programmer can completely change the "total look and feel" of a program by simply changing
the variable names. This change has no effect on the output of the program, but it can com-
pletely change the appearance of the program to the ordinary observer.
A second quality of computer programs which can easily confuse ordinary observers is
the ability of a computer to execute a program in many different orders. A computer does not
always execute a program from top to bottom, nor from first line of code to last. Instead, a
computer may execute a group of lines, called a subroutine, many times over the course of one
execution. In addition, the order in which the computer executes the program may vary de-
pending on the type of data which is used.
The voluminous number of lines in a program can also make line by line comparisons
difficult. A program consisting of 2000 lines of source code is not unusual. However, an
ordinary observer does not have the background or knowledge needed to compare two pro-
grams of over 2000 lines of code each. This problem is further compounded by the fact that
differences in variable names and ordering of the program code may be irrelevant to the com-
puters execution of the source code. See supra note 78 and infra note 141 and accompanying
text.
128. Two examples of programming structures which order data are input and output for-
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have been analogized to blank forms which also organize data. 29 How-
ever, whether input formats and other programming structures which
sequence data are sufficiently complex to warrant copyright protection is
unclear based upon analogy with prior copyright law concerning blank
forms. 130
The court in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing
Co. 131 held that input formats were not copyrightable. 32 In Synercom,
the court reiterated the axiom that copyright protection only extends to
the expression of the idea. 33 Defendants argued that input formats are
forms not intended to convey information, and therefore are not copy-
rightable. 134 In response, the court determined that forms which express
ideas and communicate information may be the subject of copyright pro-
tection. 135 The court found that protection exists when the idea is ex-
pressed through the sequencing and ordering of the data.'3 6 However,
the court questioned, "[i]f sequencing and ordering is expression, what
separable idea is expressed?"' 37 The sequence of the input formats, the
court held, could not be distinguished from the idea or principle behind
the form, and therefore it was not protected under copyright law.'
38
Substantial similarity of computer programs was addressed by the
Eighth Circuit in E.F Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America. 3 9 In
E.F. Johnson, the court stated that the substantial similarity test was
mats. Input formats sequence the data which is used by the computer to execute a program.
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1012 (N.D. Tex.
1978). Output formats define the sequencing of the data as it is visually reproduced on the
screen or printer. R. HIPGRAVE, supra note 20, at 50, 83.
129. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1011.
130. See supra notes 51-54 for a discussion of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
131. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978). In Synercom, the defendant copied plaintiff's
copyrighted program manuals and incorporated plaintiff's input formats into their program to
allow users to use defendant's program without reformatting data which had been input with
the plaintiff's program. Id. at 1009.
132. Id. at 1014.
133. Id. at 1011.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1013.
137. Id. The court concluded that "in the usual case sequence, choice and arrangement
have only stylistic significance, rather than constituting as they would here, the essence of the
expression." Id. at 1014. The court analogized the input formats to the "figure-H" pattern of
an automobile stick shift. Id. at 1013. "[C]opyright protects copying of the particular expres-
sions of the pattern, and does not prohibit another manufacturer from marketing a car using
the same pattern." Id.
138. Id.
139. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985). In E.F Johnson, plaintiff created software which
allowed a more efficient use of radio waves in mobile radio systems. Id. at 1487. Defendant
wished to create a mobile radio compatible with plaintiff's radio. Id. at 1489. Consequently,
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based on whether an ordinary observer would perceive the alleged copy
to have been taken from the original.1" The court, however, acknowl-
edged that the "application of the ordinary observer test in a computer
software context has proven problematic."' 41 This is because the com-
plexity of software and the use of computer languages creates an absence
of easily perceived characteristics in computer programs.'42 Conse-
quently, the court applied a single test'43 which focused on an expert's
analysis of the "'quantitative and qualitative evidence of similarities'"
between the two works. 1" In its "iterative" test, the court required that
defendant disassembled and examined plaintiff's source code and then developed and created a
program which was substantially similar to plaintiff's copyrighted work. Id. at 1490, 1497.
140. Id. at 1492. The court cited substantial similarity tests from Atari, Inc. v. North Am.
Philips Consumer Elecs., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982);
Warner Bros. Inc. v. ABC, 654 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1981); Whitol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777,
780 (8th Cir. 1962) and Animal Fair v. Amfesco Indus., 620 F. Supp. 175, 188 (D. Minn.
1985), aff'd without opinion, 794 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1986). Id.
141. E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1493. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text for
a statement of the ordinary observer test.
142. E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1493. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the difficulties in distinguishing idea from expression in input formats. See
infra notes 146-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulties in comparing
source code.
143. The court called this test an "iterative test." E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1493.
Iterative reproduction is "a restatement in substantially the same form (i.e. a literal copy or
translation) of a substantial portion of the copyrighted work." Note, Copyright Infringement
of Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV.
1264, 1265 n.6 (1984).
144. E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1493. In Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 685
F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982), the court based its finding of copying of the plaintiff's program, not
on the response of an ordinary observer, but on evidence of specific similarities between two
programs. Id. at 876 & n.6. The evidence included: (1) errors from early versions of plain-
tiff's program; (2) duplication of plaintiff's president's initials in screens of the video game; (3)
proof that 85% of defendant's program intructions were identical to plaintiff's; and (4) plain-
tiff's copyright notice was hidden in defendant's instructions. Id. at 876 n.6.
In E.F. Johnson, the court considered expert testimony concerning error samples, dupli-
cate tables of numbers and duplicate methods of loading data into the computer as evidence of
substantial similarity. E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1494-95.
In SAS Inst. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), the court held
that the programs were substantially similar based on expert testimony of 44 examples of
copying. Id. at 822, 830. See infra note 146 for a discussion of the defendant's use of the
plaintiff's program.
In Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983), the court based its
holding of copyright infringement on expert testimony. Id. at 752-53. Plaintiff established
that 89% of defendant's ROM instructions were identical to plaintiff's ROM instructions. Id.
at 752. Further, plaintiff established that over 97% of the instructions which control the se-
quencing of play in the video games were identical in both sets of ROMs. Id. at 752-53. See
supra notes 3-5 for a further discussion of the inference of substantial similarity from nearly
identical programs based on testimony establishing the infinite variety of ways to instruct a
computer to perform a specific task.
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the defendant's work must not only be substantially similar to the plain-
tiff's work but must also be produced by "exact duplication of substan-
tial portions of the copyrighted work."14
The issue of substantial similarity of expression was considered
again in SAS Institute v. S & H Computer Systems.'4 6 In SAS, the court
noted that "the critical issue is whether S & H appropriated from SAS
only ideas and concepts, or whether it also appropriated expression."
1 47
To establish that the S & H product was a copy or derivative work based
upon the SAS product, the court employed a substantial similarity
test. 14 The court stated that substantial similarity does not require lit-
eral identity; therefore, the expressions of the two works must only be
substantially similar.' 49 The court established "as a matter of fact that
the expression, and not merely the idea[ ]," of plaintiff's work was dupli-
cated. 50 Additionally, the court was unwilling to state that forty-four
"specific examples of copying [were] as a matter of law insubstantial."'"'
The court also considered pervasive similarities in the organization and
structural details of the two works to be further evidence of copying.'
52
Thus, the court found the two products to be substantially similar based
on examples of specific copying and structural similarities.'53
Although the court in SAS considered the similarities and structures
of the two programs, its decision was primarily based on the examples of
literal copying of the specific code of the programs.' 54 Correspondingly,
the decisions in Williams Electronics v. Artic International, Inc.,1
55
Franklin 156 and E.F. Johnson 117 were all based on similarities between
145. E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1493.
146. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). In SAS, defendants acquired the source code for
plaintiff's program. Id. at 821. Plaintiff's program could only be operated on an IBM or IBM
compatible computer. Id. at 819. To use the source code on the VAX computer, defendants
translated the code into a language which the VAX computer could execute. Id. at 821. The
defendants then used plaintiff's source code "extensively and systematically" in developing its
product. Id. at 822. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
technological background involved in developing computer programs.
147. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 829.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 830.
152. Id. The court stated, "to the extent that it represents copying of the organization and
structural details of SAS, such copying pervades the entire S & H product." Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 139.
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the actual source or object codes of the programs.5 8 However, the use of
structural similarities as a basis for a copyright infringement action has
been expanded in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory.1 59
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts of the Case
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. (JDL) manufactured dental pros-
thetics and devices.160 In 1978, Rand Jaslow, an officer and shareholder
in JDL, purchased a personal computer. 161 Although he lacked expertise
in writing computer programs, Mr. Jaslow attempted to write a program
to take care of JDL's business needs.
1 62
When Mr. Jaslow was unable to write such a program, he hired the
Strohl Systems Group, Inc. (Strohl), a small corporation that developed
custom software. 163 An agreement between Strohl and JDL stated that
Strohl would retain ownership of the software developed, and JDL
would receive a ten percent royalty on sales of the basic package."
Elaine Whelan, an officer and half owner of Strohl and an experienced
programmer, was in charge of the JDL account. 65 Ms. Whelan visited
Jaslow Lab, interviewed Mr. Jaslow and visited other dental laboratories
before writing the program Dentalab. 6 6 Dentalab was written in a com-
puter language called EDL (Event Driven Language)' 67 because JDL
needed to use the program on an IBM Series 1 computer.1 6  The pro-
gram was completed around March 1979.169
158. See supra note 144.
159. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
160. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1225 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
161. Id.
162. Id. These needs included "registering receipt of orders; processing orders; maintaining
inventory, cost controls, and customer lists; performing invoicing, billing and accounting func-
tions; and performing other related functions and services." Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1309 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
163. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1225.
164. Id. at 1225 n.2.
165. Id. at 1225.
166. Id. at 1225-26. The district court found that Elaine Whelan "conferred extensively
with Rand Jaslow" in an effort to learn the business methods "used by Jaslow Laboratory in
receiving, processing and delivering orders, invoicing, billing, controlling inventory, account-
ing and, in substance, the detailed manner in which Jaslow Laboratory conducted its business
... ." Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1310.
167. See supra notes 11-12 for a discussion of high-level programming languages.
168. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1226.
169. Id.
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In November, 1979, Whelan Associates was formed and acquired
Strohl's interest in Dentalab. 7° In 1982, Mr. Jaslow began to develop a
program with essentially the same functions as Dentalab to run on a sec-
ond computer, the IBM-PC, which many smaller dental laboratories
owned. 17 This program, called Dentcom, was written in a programming
language called BASIC. 172 Mr. Jaslow used a copy of the source code of
Dentalab to develop Dentcom.173 On May 31, 1983, JDL sent a letter to
Whelan Associates terminating the agreement between Whelan Associ-
ates and JDL. 174 The letter also stated that JDL considered itself to be
the exclusive marketer of Dentalab.175 On August 1, 1983, a new com-
pany called Dentcom was formed to sell the Dentcom program.
176
Dentcom sold the Dentalab system under the names of both Dentalab
and Dentlab, in addition to its sales of the Dentcom program.177 In its
advertising of the Dentcom program, Dentcom described the program as
"'a new version of the Dentlab [sic] computer system.' ",178 However,
170. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1311. Two later agreements terminated all of Strohl's mar-
keting rights relating to Dentalab, and all of Strobl's interest in the "'Dentalab Package.'"
Id. The Dentalab Package "expressly included all related technical sales and operating manu-
als, advertising materials, program source codes, flow charts and related material as well as all
copyright entitlements ...." Id.
171. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1226; Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1314.
172. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1226. See supra notes 11-12 for a discussion of BASIC and other
high-level programming languages.
173. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1314. Although the source code for Dentalab was to be kept
in the exclusive possession of Whelan Associates, and Rand Jaslow was never authorized to
have a copy of this source code, Mr. Jaslow "surreptitiously and without consent of either
Strohl Systems or Whelan Associates obtained a copy of the source code which he utilized in
trying to develop [Dentcom]." Id. Rand Jaslow, who had been unable to create the Dentalab
program without Elaine Whelan's assistance, was similarly unsuccessful at writing the
Dentcom program. Consequently, JDL hired Jonathan Novack to develop the newest pro-
gram. Id. at 1314-15. Mr. Novak found the work done by Rand Jaslow "to be the work of a
talented but unskilled amateur, containing many errors, and showing a lack of expertise in
computer programming and designing." Id. at 1315.
174. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1226. The letter was inadvertedly dated January 31, 1983 by the
district court. Id. at n.5 (citing Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp.
1307, 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877
(1987). In the letter, JDL "demanded return of 'all materials related to the Dentalab Package
including source and object codes and other pertinent documents.'" Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at
1313.
175. Id. In district court, JDL claimed that it was the sole owner of the Dentalab source
and object codes because the program was written exclusively for Jaslow Laboratory. Whelan,
609 F. Supp. at 1316. However, the district court found that "Jaslow Laboratory did not own
or hold a proprietary interest in the computer software system or its source or object codes
.. " Id. at 1318.
176. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1226-27.
177. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1315.
178. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1227.
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Whelan Associates also continued to sell Dentalab. 7 9
B. Procedural History
On June 30, 1983, JDL filed suit in state court alleging trade secret
misappropriation by Whelan Associates through its sales of Dentalab.
80
JDL claimed that Dentalab contained "valuable trade secrets of Jaslow
Dental Laboratory." '' In response, Whelan Associates filed suit in the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging that the
sale of the Dentalab and Dentcom programs infringed Whelan Associ-
ates' copyright in Dentalab, "that Dentcom's use of the terms 'Dentlab'
or 'Dentalab' violated Pennsylvania common law and 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a), . . . and that Dentcom's activities violated various other fed-
eral and state laws pertaining to unfair competition and tortious interfer-
ence with contractual relations."
' 182
JDL and the other defendants denied all liability, claiming that
Whelan Associates' copyright was invalid, and even if it were valid, Mr.
Jaslow did not violate the copyright because he developed the Dentcom
program independently.' 83 JDL also claimed that the terms "Dentalab"
and "Dentcom" were "general descriptions of goods and services, not
names of particular products." '184 Therefore, according to JDL,
Dentcom's use of those terms did not violate state or federal law.185 JDL
counterclaimed that Whelan Associates had infringed its copyright and
engaged in unfair competition through its sales of Dentalab.' 86 JDL's
trade secret action was removed from state court, and became a counter-
claim to the federal suit.
187
JDL filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Whelan
Associates from using JDL's trade secrets.' 88 However, the court denied
any preliminary relief, and the case was brought to trial.'8 9
179. Id.
180. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
181. Letter from JDL to Strohl giving notice of termination of agreement. Id. at 1226-27.
182. Id. at 1227 (citations omitted).
183. Id. The Third Circuit explained that § 106 of the Copyright Act "forbids the copying
of copyrighted works. The independent creation of even identical works is therefore not a
copyright infringement, and independent creation is a complete defense to a claim of copyright
infringement." Id. at 1227 n.7.
184. Id. at 1227.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1227-28.
188. Id. at 1228.
189. Id.
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At trial, JDL continued to deny all of Whelan Associates' allega-
tions.' 90 Dr. Moore testified as a computer expert for Whelan Associ-
ates.1 91 In his testimony, Dr. Moore stated that the person who wrote
the Dentcom program "either worked from the source code or had a
thorough knowledge of the Series 1 system."'192 He also testified that
"most of the file structures, and the screen outputs, of the programs were
virtually identical"' 193 and "five particularly important 'subroutines'
within both programs . . . performed almost identically in both
programs."
94
JDL called Mr. Ness who testified as its computer expert. 195 In con-
trast to Dr. Moore's testimony, Mr. Ness compared "the similarities and
differences in the source and object codes"' 196 and found that "the
Dentcom system [was] not directly derived from.., the [Dentalab] sys-
tem[ ]P'197 However, Mr. Ness "did not examine the actual operation of
any of the systems in dispute."' 98
The district court ruled for Whelan Associates on almost all
grounds."' It found that JDL did not own the source or object codes for
Dentalab,2°° and that Whelan Associates was the owner of a valid copy-
right in the Dentalab system.20'
Finally, the district court weighed the evidence of substantial simi-
larity between Dentalab and the Dentcom program.20 2 It concluded
"that the IBM-PC Dentcom system is a copy of the IBM-Series 1
Dentalab system, and that it was an improper appropriation constituting
a copyright infringement."20 3 On appeal, JDL only challenged the dis-
trict court's finding "that the Dentcom program infringe[d] the copyright
190. Id. At trial, JDL abandoned the trade secrets claim. Id.
191. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1316.
192. Id.
193. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1228.
194. Id. See infra note 285.
195. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1228. Mr. Ness was incorrectly identified as Mr. Hess by the
district court. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1316.
196. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1228; Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1316.
197. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1228.
198. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1316.
199. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1228.
200. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1320.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1321-22.
203. Id. at 1322. The district court found that defendants did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1125
through their use of the name Dentlab. Id. at 1323. However, it did not rule on Whelan
Associates' allegations of Pennsylvania common law violation. The district court stated that
damages for this cause of action had not been established. Id.
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of plaintiffs' Dentalab system." 2"
C. The Court's Reasoning
In determining whether the Dentcom program was copied in writ-
ing the Dentalab program, the Third Circuit in Whelan Associates v. Jas-
low Dental Laboratory2"5 stated that copying may be inferred from
evidence "that the defendant had access to the ... copyrighted work and
that the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to the copy-
righted work."2 °6 Access to the copyrighted work had not been estab-
lished.20 7 Therefore, the appellate court had only to determine whether
the Dentcom and Dentalab programs were substantially similar.20 8
1. The scope of copyright protection of computer programs
Although the Whelan court recognized that copyright protection for
source and object codes had been established through case law,209 the
court reasoned that the issue in this case was "whether a program's copy-
right protection covers the structure of the program or only the pro-
gram's literal elements, i.e., its source and object codes."21 The court
stated that for the purpose of copyright protection, computer programs
204. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1229.
205. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
206. Id. at 1232 (emphasis added) (citing Ferguson v. NBC, 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir.
1978); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th
Cir. 1977); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 863 (1975); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 753 (N.D. Ill. 1983)).
The Whelan court examined two requirements to determine if the copyright on Dentalab
had been infringed. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1231. The court examined Whelan's ownership of
the copyright and whether the Dentalab program was copied in writing Dentcom. Id. (citing
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.
1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 980 (1976)); 3 NIMMER, supra note 31, at § 13.01. As to the first element, the district
court had found that Whelan Associates owned the copyright on Dentalab. Whelan Assocs. v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1320 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
207. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1314. On appeal, Jaslow did not contest either the finding of
Whelan's ownership of the Dentalab program copyright nor the finding of access to the
Dentalab source code. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1231-32.
208. Id. at 1232.
209. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (computer program is copyrightable whether in its
object or source code version); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875-76
(3d Cir. 1982) (court held that copyright protection extends to object code of computer pro-
gram). See supra notes 111-58 and accompanying text for a further discussion of computer
copyright law.
210. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234. The court also stated that the issue is "whether mere simi-
larity in the overall structure of programs can be the basis for a copyright infringement." Id.
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are classified as literary works, 21' and that the Copyright Act protects
original works of authorship, including literary works. 12 The court ex-
plained that the copyright of literary works such as books and plays may
be violated through a copying of the plot, a nonliteral device.213
Through analogy, the court reasoned that a computer program may be
infringed by a copying of program structures, despite complete dissimi-
larities in literal elements.21 4
JDL had argued against copyright protection of a program's struc-
ture for two reasons. 215 First, JDL had argued that the CONTU Re-
port216 recommended copyright protection be limited to the literal
elements of a computer program.21 7 Second, JDL had contended that
copyright protection extends to the expression of an idea, not the idea
itself.218 Therefore, JDL had reasoned, the structure of a computer pro-
gram could not be copyrighted because it is "by definition the idea and
not the expression of the idea.
' 219
a. the CONTU report
The CONTU Report has been followed by some courts as the legis-
lative history of section 117 because the report was adopted "without
211. Id. at 1234. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5667. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
212. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1982)),
213. Id. See Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir.
1983) (thirteen plot similarities were sufficient basis for trial court to determine copyright in-
fringement); Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1167 (McDonald characters infringed copyright on H.R.
Pufnstuf characters without duplication or near identity); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures,
81 F.2d 49, 54-55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936) (similarities in sequence of event
action in the movie Letty Lyntor violated copyright of Dishonored Lady despite differences in
dialogue); Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
902 (1931) (examination of literary works for copyright infringement "cannot be limited liter-
ally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations").
214. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234.
215. Id. at 1235, 1240.
216. See text accompanying note 106.
217. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1241. Brief for Appellant at 15-21, Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987) (No. 85-
1358). JDL cited Arthur J. Levine, Executive Director of CONTU, as stating that "CONTU
was primarily concerned with protecting computer programs against direct duplication of the
program code by photocopying or other means." Brief for Appellant at 17 (citation omitted).
JDL also argued that "[n]owhere in [the discussion of the scope of copyright in computer
programs was] mention made of the appropriation of the structure, organization, or logic of a
program. The CONTU Report clearly manifest[ed] an assumption that the scope of protection
is limited to the language of the program." Brief for Appellant at 18.
218. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1235.
219. Id.
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alterations and without any committee reports."22 JDL had argued
that, as such, the CONTU Report's recommendation that copyright pro-
tection be limited to the literal elements of a program was persuasive
legislative history.22' In response, the court stated that the CONTU Re-
port, instead of limiting copyright protection to the literal code of a pro-
gram, demonstrates that the commission intended nonliteral elements to
be protected.222 As support for this argument, the court quoted a section
of the CONTU Report which discussed the idea/expression dichotomy:
"Flow Charts, source codes, and object codes are works of authorship in
which copyright subsists" and may not be copied without the author's
consent.223
Although the court recognized that the CONTU Report recom-
mended that copyright protection should be extended to the nonliteral
elements of computer programs, it was not willing to consider the report
persuasive legislative history. The court stated that the CONTU Report
and its indication of the legislative history only applies to section 117 of
the Copyright Act, which was amended as a result of the Report.224
Based on the determination that the only statutory provision at issue in
Whelan was section 102(b), the court held that the concepts contained in
the CONTU Report were not binding on the court in Whelan.
225
b. classification of the structure of a computer program as expression
rather than idea
In its second argument, JDL had stated that copyright protection
cannot extend to the structure of a program because the structure of a
program is by defininition the idea of a program.226 The Third Circuit
acknowledged that copyright protection, as embodied in 17 U.S.C. sec-
tion 102(b), solely protects expression of ideas. 227 This distinction is not
220. Id. at 1241. In Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984),
the court held that the "CONTU Report... compromises the entire legislative history of
§ 117." Id. at 35 n.7. The district court in Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741
(N.D. Ill. 1983), noted: "Although the Congressional action in 1980 does not appear to be
supported by a legislative history, it is fair to conclude, since Congress adopted its recommen-
dations without alteration, that the CONTU Report reflects the Congressional intent." Id. at
750 n.6.
221. See supra note 217.
222. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1241.
223. Id. (quoting NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKs, FINAL REPORT 21 (1978)) (emphasis in original).
224. Id. at 1241-42.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1235.
227. Id. at 1234. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) states: "In no case does copyright protection
... extend to any idea... regardless of the form in which it is described ... or embodied in
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only embodied in statute,22 8 but also in the legislative history of section
102(b). This history states "that the basic dichotomy between expression
and idea remains unchanged" after the amendment to the Copyright Act,
which specifically protects computer programs. 229 The court examined
case law concerning the idea/expression dichotomy to articulate a rule
for evaluating the two concepts in the context of computer programs.230
First, the court stated that the purpose of copyright law is to balance
the interest in protection of the programmer's work with the public inter-
est in dissemination of information to promote learning, culture and de-
velopment.231 If the distinction between idea and expression is made
imprecisely, then the balance of interests will favor one side, to the detri-
ment of the other. Consequently, if expression is defined to include a
broad range of computer programs, programmers will receive more pro-
tection than is necessary, and if expression is limited to the most detailed
level of a computer program, the public will unduly benefit from the
programmer's efforts.
The court then examined Baker v. Selden 212 for a method to distin-
guish idea from expression.233 In Baker, the Supreme Court stated that
when methods and diagrams are necessary for the practical application
of the art, the methods and diagrams are not copyrightable.234 The
Third Circuit in Whelan suggested that the Baker test establishes that
"the line between idea and expression may be drawn with reference to
the end sought to be achieved by the work in question." '235 The court
stated, "the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's
idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function
such work." The court cited several cases which enunciated this distinction, including: Baker
v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (blank pages and account books illustrating system of book-
keeping were not subject of copyright because they were necessary to use of system); Universal
Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 906 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975);
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217, reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954) ("Unlike a patent, a
copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expres-
sion of the idea-not the idea itself."); and Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926).
228. See supra note 227.
229. H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWs at
5670.
230. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1235.
231. Id.
232. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
233. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
234. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103. See supra note 35 for a discussion of the copyrightability of
ruled lines and headings as discussed in Baker. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54 for a
discussion of delineating idea from expression as formulated in Baker.
235. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
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would be part of the expression of the idea." '236 The court reasoned that
when a purpose may be achieved through many different methods, the
means chosen will be the expression of the work and therefore the subject
of copyright protection.
237
The court noted that scenes a faire and fact intensive works are not
protected under copyright law.238 The court defined scenes a faire as
"incidents, characters or settings" which can only be expressed through
one means.23 9 The court also defined fact intensive works as material in
which there is a limited number of ways to express the idea.24 ° The court
stated that giving these types of works, in which expression cannot be
separated from idea, copyright protection would have the effect of giving
a monopoly on a commonplace idea to the author.24'
Similarly, the court noted that the scope of copyright protection is
limited for works whose purpose is to perform a certain function in a
specific manner.242 The court stated that when the structure of a pro-
gram is essential to performing a task in a specific way, the idea and
expression will be inseparable, and therefore the structure of the program
will not be given copyright protection. 243 Further, the court noted that
when a variety of methods are available to organize data or perform tasks
within a copyright program, the detailed structure of the program may
be given copyright protection without granting a monopoly to the author
on a commonplace idea.2'
In its analysis of two programs, the Whelan court held that the
structure for the Dentalab program was not essential to the purpose of
aiding the business of a dental laboratory.24 Instead, other programs on
the market which accomplished the same purpose, yet used different
structures, demonstrated that the structure of Dentalab was separable
236. Id. (emphasis in original).
237. Id. at 1236.
238. Id.
239. Id. (quoting Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982)). The Atari court stressed the concept that when an
idea and its expression are indistinguishable, copyright of the expression will grant a monopoly
over the idea. Atari, 672 F.2d at 615-16. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text for an
example of this concept.
240. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236-37. Only a limited number of ways exist in which an author
may tell the story of George Washington's life, a fact-intensive work, without losing the factual
nature of the work.
241. Id. at 1236 (quoting Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d
485, 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984)).
242. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238 n.34.
243. Id. at 1238 & n.34.
244. Id. at 1240.
245. Id. at 1238.
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from its purpose. Thus, the structure of Dentalab could properly be clas-
sified as part of the expression of the program.246
JDL had argued that only the literal elements of a program should
be subject to copyright protection because creating the complete code for
a program using only the structure would still require a great deal of time
and effort.24 7 The court responded that the protection of the structure of
a program will enable a programmer to gain an advantage over competi-
tors who do not have the benefit of the effort used to organize the pro-
gram.248 The court added that copyright law is not concerned with the
amount of effort an infringer must spend to copy an original work. 49
The issue is only whether the copyright of the original work had been
infringed, not the difficulty encountered in copying the work. 50
Next, the court supported its holding with an economic argument
that copyright protection beyond the literal code of a program would
provide an incentive for programmers to create new works by protecting
their efforts while allowing other programmers to write programs which
accomplish the same purpose.25 1 The court stated that structure and
logic constitute significant costs in writing a computer program, and,
therefore, should be given copyright protection.252
Finally, the Whelan court responded to one commentator's argu-
ment, that progress in the computer field is "significantly different from
that in other fields."' 25 3 This argument concluded that progress in the
area of computer technology could only be made through the copying of
advances made in preexisting programs. 4 According to this commenta-
tor, the difference necessitates a restricted application in computer pro-
gram cases of copyright standards that were developed for other types of
literary works.255
The court rejected the notion that the area of computer technology
is different from other areas of science in its use of the work of predeces-
246. Id. at 1239.
247. Id. at 1237.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. The court was referring to a statement it made that the coding process was a small
part of programming in comparison with the expense and time attributable to the development
of the structure and logic, as well as debugging and documentation. Id. at 1231.
253. Id. at 1238. The court was responding to the arguments made in Note, supra note 143,
at 1292 (footnote omitted).
254. Note, supra note 253, at 1292.
255. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238.
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sors. 256 Therefore, the court held that it is appropriate to apply copy-
right principles derived from other areas.257 Consequently, in its analysis
of the copyright infringement claim, the Third Circuit first distinguished
the expression of the Dentalab program, and then compared the similari-
ties between the two works.
258
2. Application of copyright concepts
In applying the concept that the expression of a computer program
extends beyond its literal elements, the court first determined that the
purpose of the Dentalab program was to manage the business operations
of a dental laboratory. 2 9 The court cited the district court's finding that
evidence revealed that other programs performed functions similar to
those in the Dentalab program, yet Whelan Associates did not contend
that they infringed on the Dentalab copyright.2 6 ° Therefore, the district
court had reasoned, the multiple methods of creating a structure for the
purpose desired in a program indicate that the expression of a computer
program is the manner in which the program controls the computer in
executing computer programs. 61 The Third Circuit agreed with this
reasoning and ruled that "the detailed structure of the Dentalab program
is part of the expression, not the idea, of that program.
' 262
The court cited SAS Institute v. S & H Computer Systems 263 as sup-
port for its reasoning. The Whelan court mimicked the SAS court's use
of evidence of copying of the organizational and structural similarities to
support a finding of copying.264 The Whelan court also reasoned that the
Copyright Act of 1976 indicates congressional intent to protect works
which are formed by sequencing or arrangement in a way that creates an
original work.265 The court relied on definitions of "compilation" and
256. Id. The court quoted Sir Isaac Newton who explained that "if [he] had seen further
than other men, it was because [he] had stood on the shoulders of giants." Id. at 1238 n.33.
257. Id. at 1238.
258. See supra notes 44-47 for a discussion of the application of a two-step procedure for
evaluating copyright infringement claims.
259. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238 (footnote omitted).
260. Id. at 1238 (citing Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307,
1320 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987)).
261. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1320.
262. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239.
263. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). In SAS, the court found 44 examples of copying,
although the court did not discuss the nature of the copying. Id. at 829-30. See supra notes
146-47 and accompanying text for a further discussion of SAS.
264. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239 (quoting SAS Inst. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp.
816, 830 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)). See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
265. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239. Section 103 of the Act extends copyright protection to
compilations and derivative works. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982). Section 101 defines a "compila-
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"derivative work"-which include the words "arranged" and "re-
cast"'2 6 6 -to conclude that "Congress was aware of the fact that the se-
quencing and ordering of materials could be copyrighted. ''267
The Third Circuit then addressed and distinguished Synercom Tech-
nology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.,268 which denied copyright pro-
tection for the sequence and order of a computer program.269 Stating
that the Synercom decision was based on the judge's finding that the
structure of input formats was inseparable from the program's idea,270
the Whelan court noted that it had previously shown that "Congress in-
tended sequencing and ordering to be protectible" when the sequencing
and order constitute expression.271 The court added that input formats
lacked the structural complexity of full programs and may be
distinguishable.272
Finally, the Synercom court asked, "if sequencing and ordering is
expression, what separable idea is being expressed?" '273 The Whelan
court answered by stating that the variety of structures available for ex-
pressing a program's idea demonstrates that the expression is not indis-
tinguishable from the idea.274 Therefore, the Whelan court determined
that the court in Synercom was incorrect in distinguishing the copyright-
ability of the sequence element in a computer program from that of any
other element.275
3. A single, integrated substantial similarity test
After the Whelan court determined that the structure of a program
was copyrightable, the court addressed the similarities between the struc-
tion" as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials... that are
selected, coordinated or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes
an original work of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
Section 101 also defines "derivative work" as "a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as ... musical arrangement ... or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed or adapted." Id.
266. See infra note 274.
267. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239.
268. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
269. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239. In Synercom, the court held that input formats, which
control the sequence of the information entered into the program, were ideas and therefore not
protected by copyright law. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013.
270. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239.
271. Id. at 1240.
272. Id. at 1239.
273. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013.
274. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1240. According to the Whelan court, the Synercom court was
unclear on whether the idea of input formats could be accomplished through any other se-
quencing. Id. at 1240 n.36.
275. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1240.
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tures of the Dentcom and Dentalab programs. To determine the proper
substantial similarity test to use in computer program cases, the court
examined the bifurcated test enunciated in Arnstein v. Porter276 and Sid
& Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonald's Corp. 2 77 This test
consists of an extrinsic examination of the similarities between the two
works in question to determine if the copyrighted work was used to cre-
ate the second program and an intrinsic examination of whether the de-
fendant appropriated the expression.27 8 Expert testimony may be used to
prove the first element of the test.279 Once the extrinsic test is met, the
intrinsic test must be applied. Under the intrinsic test, the trier of fact,
from the perspective of a lay observer and without expert testimony, ex-
amines the evidence to decide whether the allegedly infringing program
was an "illicit" or "unlawful appropriation" of the copyrighted work.280
The Whelan court chose to eliminate the extrinsic test because of the
public's unfamilarity with the complex nature of computer programs.
The court reasoned that triers of fact in cases concerning computer pro-
grams may find it difficult to ignore the expert opinion establishing the
extrinsic test, and examine the program from the view of a lay
observer.81
Instead of using the bifurcated test, the Whelan court adopted a sub-
stantial similarity test which collapses both tests using lay and expert
testimony into a single, integrated inquiry.2 82 In applying its single test,
the court considered expert testimony as to similarities of file struc-
tures,283 screen outputs284 and five subroutines285 between the two
works.286 Next, based again on expert testimony, the court evaluated the
276. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
277. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
278. Id. at 468. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
279. Arnstehi, 154 F.2d at 468; Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233.
280. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
281. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232-33.
282. Id. at 1233. As support for its decision, the Third Circuit court cited several cases
where courts had rejected the bifurcated test in favor of a standard which relies entirely on
expert testimony. The court cited E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp.
1485, 1493 (D. Minn. 1985), Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 2
Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,529 (D. Idaho 1983), Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F.
Supp. 741, 752-53 (N.D. Il. 1983), and FED. R. EVID. 702. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233.
283. A file structure is the arrangement of data within a file. R. HIPGRAVE, supra note 20,
at 49.
284. Screen outputs are the audiovisual displays on the screen of a computer. See supra
note 128.
285. A subroutine is "a self-contained routine that is part of either another routine or pro-
gram. Subroutines often take the form of common standardized operations, such as ... the
execution of a standard mathematical equation." R. HIPGRAVE, supra note 20, at 104.
286. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1242-45.
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importance of the substantially similar elements of the programs, and
made a "qualitative" judgment as to the degree of similarity between the
structures of the programs.2 87
4. Evidence of substantial similarity
JDL had attacked the district court's holding of substantial similar-
ity based upon similarities between the structures of the programs.288
JDL had argued that copyright protection only extends to the program
code-the object and source codes-and the district court found no simi-
larity between these elements of the Dentalab and Dentcom programs.
289
JDL had also objected to the district court's holding on the ground that
the evidence of substantial similarity was insufficient to find a copyright
infringement.290 The court addressed both of JDL's arguments.
a. findings of substantial similarity without similarity
of source or object code
In response to JDL's argument that substantial similarity had not
been established because the district court had not found any similarities
between the object and source codes of the Dentcom and Dentalab pro-
grams, the court declared that it was unnecessary to find substantial simi-
larities between the literal elements of the programs. 91 Instead, the
Whelan court held that the district court's finding of substantial similar-
ity between the copyrightable structures of the Dentalab and Dentcom
programs was sufficient to warrant a holding of copyright
infringement.2 92
b. evidence of substantial similarity through nonliteral elements of a
computer program
JDL had attacked the existence of substantial similarity from four
fronts. It argued that even if copyright protection were not limited to the
literal elements of a computer program, the evidence of substantial simi-
larity between the Dentalab and Dentcom programs was insufficient to
support a ruling of copyright infringement.293 First, JDL stated that the
testimony of Whelan's expert as to the similarity of the programs was
287. Id. at 1245-46.
288. Id. at 1233.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1233-39.
292. Id. at 1248. See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
293. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1242.
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flawed.294 JDL asserted that Dr. Moore's testimony concerning similari-
ties in the file structures of the Dentcom and Dentalab programs was
irrelevant because file structures are not copyrightable. 95 JDL argued
that file structures of a computer program are similar to blank forms
because they merely provide a structure to hold information.296 Further,
JDL claimed that based on Baker v. Selden,297 blank forms and therefore
file structures may not be copyrighted.2 98
JDL had also argued that similarity in screen outputs is irrelevant to
a finding of copyright infringement because screen outputs are protected
by a different copyright than computer programs 99 and bear no relation
to the underlying program used to produce them. 3" Thus, according to
JDL's argument, a finding of similarities in screen outputs is not indica-
tive of similarities in the underlying programs.
Next, JDL had argued that Dr. Moore's comparison of the five sub-
routines in both the Dentcom and Dentalab programs was insufficient to
establish substantial similarity between the overall structure of the two
programs. 30 1 As interpreted by the court, JDL's argument asserted that
substantial similarity between two works cannot be shown without a
comparison of the greater part of the works.302
Finally, JDL had alleged that the district court erred in its determi-
nation of the strength of the differing expert testimonies.30 3 JDL con-
294. Id. Whelan stated that "Dr. Moore's, [Whelan's] expert, testimony firmly establishes
that Dentcom's data files and control programs are substantially identical to those data files
and programs in the Whelan Dentalab program." Brief for Appellee at 35, Whelan Assocs. v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987)
(No. 85-1358).
295. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1242.
296. Id. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 217, at 35.
297. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
298. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1242.
299. Sections 101 and 102(a)(5) classify screen outputs as audiovisual works. Brief for Ap-
pellant, supra note 217, at 38; 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(5) (1982). Appellant's brief cites Atari,
Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982), and Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981), for the
theory that "the copyright in a computer program does not protect against creation by another
of a similar audiovisual display." Brief for Appellant, supra note 217, at 39.
300. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1244. See supra note 127 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the infinite number of ways to write a computer program to perform one specific task.
301. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1245.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1246. Although the district court concluded that it is difficult for someone with
little knowledge of the computer field to judge the credibility of experts in the area, it found
Dr. Moore's "testimony more credible and helpful because of his detailed and thorough analy-
sis of the many similarities." Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307,
1321-22 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877
(1987).
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tended that Dr. Moore's testimony concerning the similarity of the
structure of the programs was insufficient to establish substantial similar-
ity.3" In contrast, JDL asserted that its expert's testimony, that of Mr.
Ness, was sufficiently strong to disprove copyright infringement.3"5
The Third Circuit addressed each of JDL's four arguments individu-
ally. First, the court stated that although JDL's definition of file struc-
tures as merely structures to store and collect information is correct, 30 6 a
majority of courts have allowed copyright protection for blank forms
which "are sufficiently innovative that their arrangement of information
is itself informative. ' 30 7 The court found that the file structures for the
Dentalab program "[were] sufficiently informative to deserve copyright
protection. ' 308  Therefore, the court employed similarities in the
Dentcom and Dentalab file structures as probative evidence in a finding
of substantial similarity between the overall structure of the two
programs.
Second, the court addressed JDL's argument that similarities in
screen outputs are irrelevant to a finding of substantial similarity between
program structures. The court admitted that screen outputs are pro-
tected by a different copyright than computer programs.30 9 However,
the court found screen outputs to be sufficiently related to the program
which produces them to have evidentiary value as proof of copyright
infringement.
310
Third, the court stated that although Dr. Moore compared only five
subroutines, a finding of substantial similarity does not require that the
304. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1246.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1242.
307. Id. at 1243. The court cited several cases which permitted copyright protection for
blank forms. See Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, 542 F.2d 1053
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977) (gas station account books); Baldwin Cooke
Co. v. Keith Clarke, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd per curium, 505 F.2d 1250 (7th
Cir. 1974) (a combined calendar, appointment, diary and information book); and Harcourt
Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (answer
sheets for achievement tests). Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1243 n.41.
308. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1243.
309. Id. at 1244.
310. Id. The Third Circuit added that the admissibility of screen outputs "does not neces-
sarily mean that such evidence would be alone sufficient to withstand motions of summary
judgment or directed verdict." Id. at 1244 n.45. The court also refuted Jaslow's argument
that testimony concerning screen outputs, because they are easily understood, would have an
undue influence on the trier of fact. Id. at 1245. The court reasoned that this argument was
unpersuasive as proof that the district court erred in its finding of substantial similarities be-
tween the programs' structures because the record showed no record of JDL's objection to the
testimony. Id. The circuit court ruled that the objection was waived based on the Appellants
failure to object to evidence concerning screen similarities. Id.
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majority of two works be compared.311 The court found that an analogy
to other areas of copyright law demonstrated that a "court must make a
qualitative, not quantitative judgment about the character of the work as
a whole and the importance of the substantially similar portion of the
work., 312 Therefore, the court concluded, the proper analysis for sub-
stantial similarities between computer programs is an analysis of the
most significant portions of the programs.313
Fourth, the court addressed JDL's argument that Dr. Moore's testi-
mony was insufficient to establish substantial similarity. The court stated
that the determination of the credibility of witnesses is a matter for the
district court.3 14 JDL's expert, Mr. Ness, examined the differences in the
source and object codes of the two programs,315 while Dr. Moore, Whe-
lan's expert, examined the "similarities and differences in the programs'
structures. '' 316 The Third Circuit stated that Dr. Moore's testimony,
which showed a "marked similarity between the programs, ' ' 317 was rele-
vant to the issues before the court. Therefore, the court concluded that
the evidence was sufficient to find substantial similarity.31 5
5. Summary of findings
The Third Circuit concluded that "(1) copyright protection of com-
puter programs may extend beyond the programs' literal code to their
structure, sequence and organization, and (2) the district court's finding
of substantial similarity between the Dentalab and Dentcom programs
was not clearly erroneous. ' 319 Therefore, the Whelan court upheld the
district court's judgment.3 2°
311. Id. Dr. Moore, Whelan's expert, testified that he had examined the portions of the
program which showed the flow of information through the system and performed the impor-
tant tasks of the system. Id. at 1246.
312. Id. at 1245. The court cited Atari where the court warned, "when analyzing two
works to determine whether they are substantially similar, courts should be careful not to lose
sight of the forest for the trees." Id. (quoting Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer
Elecs., 672 F.2d 607, 618 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982)).
313. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1246.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1246-47. The court emphasized that while Mr. Ness examined the computer
code, he never observed the programs at work on the computers, and he was unfamiliar with
EDL, the programming language that was used in Dentalab. Id.
316. Id. at 1247 (emphasis in original).
317. Id. at 1248.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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VI. ANALYSIS
The court in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory32 ' ruled
that copyright protection for a computer program extends beyond the
literal code to the program's structure, sequence and organization. 322 In
addition, the court held that in evaluating substantial similarity of com-
puter programs, a bifurcated test, which determines substantial similarity
of the expressions of the two works based solely on the response of an
ordinary lay observer, is inappropriate.323 Instead, the court applied a
single, integrated test which admits both lay and expert testimony in a
single inquiry.3 24 Finally, the court stated that the appropriate rule for
distinguishing idea from expression in cases involving copyright pro-
grams is a rule which delineates the idea as the purpose or function of the
work, and the expression as those elements that are not necessary to that
purpose or function.
325
The following analysis will demonstrate that: (1) the court's exten-
sion of copyright protection to a program's structure creates an incentive
for programmers to create new works, and fosters technology; (2) the
court's use of a single, integrated substantial similarity test in cases in-
volving computer programs is appropriate; (3) the court's idea/expres-
sion dichotomy test based on the purpose or function of a program
fosters the goals of copyright law; but (4) when evaluating substantial
similarity betweeen two programs, a court should look beyond the copy-
rightable expression of the programs, and evaluate the impact of un-
copyrightable elements of expression.
A. Extension of Copyright Protection to a Program's Structure
The Third Circuit in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Labora-
tory326 extended copyright protection far beyond the scope of protection
granted by previous courts. The court held that copyright protection
extends not only to the literal elements of a program, the source and
object codes,327 but beyond to the nonliteral elements of overall struc-
321. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
322. Id. at 1248.
323. Id. at 1233.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1236.
326. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
327. Copyright protection for source and object codes was established in Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033
(1984) and Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982). See supra
notes 111-21 and accompanying text.
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ture, sequence and organization of programs.328
Computer programs are literary works3 2 9 which require a great deal
of time and effort to create.33 If copyright law is to foster creativity, an
author must be rewarded for his or her original creations.33 ' Courts have
rewarded literary authors by extending copyright protection beyond the
literal elements, such as dialogue.3 32 Instead, copyright protection ex-
tends to the plot, character traits and settings.333 Similar rewards should
be given to software authors. Computer programs are more than specific
instructions that are grouped together into a rigid order. A program
may contain expression which renders the program superior to other
programs which perform the same function. For example, a completed
program may have menus, which an ordinary lay user can easily use,3 34 it
may process information quickly 335 or it may be well-suited for use in
dental labs.336
All of these superior qualities are the result of the structure, se-
quence and organization of the program. Just as an author of a play
chooses his or her words and the sequence of his or her scenes carefully
to achieve a desired effect on the audience, a programmer organizes his
or her program to appeal to the user.
328. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1248.
329. See supra note 109.
330. See supra notes 6-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of a method used to
create a computer program.
331. See supra notes 41-43 for a discussion of the purpose of copyright law.
332. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669
(1936). See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
333. Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54-55.
334. See Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal.
1986). In Broderbund, plaintiff's program allowed users to create greeting cards. Id. at 1130.
However, the program could only be operated on Apple computers. Id. When plaintiff
wanted to convert its program for use on IBM computers, it hired defendant. Defendant's
programmer attempted to create an exact duplication of plaintiff's program, until negotiations
between plaintiff and defendant broke down. Id. at 1131. At this time, defendant instructed
his programmers to create an enhanced version of plaintiff's program, and to use the work
they had already completed. Id. The court stated that "[t]he 'total concept and feel' of these
programs is virtually identical." Id. at 1137 (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977)). Therefore, the court held that de-
fendant's program infringed plaintiff's copyright. Id.
335. See E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
See supra note 139.
The organization of data may determine the speed at which a computer may process the
information. A programmer must take into consideration the amount of available memory
when designing a program. An efficient program will use the available memory to its fullest
capacity and attain maximum speed of execution. D. DRURY, THE ART OF COMPUTER PRO-
GRAMMING 30-31 (1983).
336. See Whelan, 797 F.2d 1222.
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One characteristic of computers is that programs can be produced in
an almost infinite number of ways.337 Limiting copyright protection to
the literal code of a program would allow a programmer to duplicate
attractive attributes of an economically successful program, yet avoid
copyright infringement through a completely different source code. The
second programmer would save the time and effort expended in creating
an original program.
In contrast, copyright protection for nonliteral elements, such as
structure, sequence and organization, which are not necessary to the idea
of the program, provides computer programmers with an incentive to
create new programs which they know will be protected. Technology
will be fostered when other programmers independently create programs
which express the same idea through original expression.338
B. A Single, Integrated Substantial Similarity Test
for Computer Programs
The second element of the Arnstein/Krofft test measures substantial
similarity between the expressions of two works based solely on the re-
sponse of an ordinary lay observer.339 Originally, the ordinary lay ob-
server test was used to evaluate similarities between plays, 340 musical
compositions 341 and characters from children's television shows.34 2 The
ordinary lay observer is familiar with each of these areas of literary
works. Furthermore, the ordinary lay observer, a person without any
special education or knowledge in the field of plays, music or children's
characters, may discern similarities between works in these fields through
viewing or listening to a work. However, as the Third Circuit correctly
stated, an ordinary lay observer-a person without any special education
or knowledge in the field of computers-cannot easily discern similarities
between computer programs.343 The highly technical nature of computer
programs necessitates a background in computer programming to make
analysis of similarities between programs meaningful. 34
337. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
338. For a contrary opinion, see Note, supra note 143, at 1288-94. See also supra notes 253-
55 and accompanying text for a discussion of this Note's argument.
339. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th
Cir. 1977). See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
340. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1944).
341. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946). See supra notes 70-75 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the copyright infringement test developed by the Arn-
stein court.
342. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
343. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
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The Third Circuit's use of a single, integrated substantial similarity
test recognizes the inability of an ordinary lay observer to analyze com-
puter programs. Without expert testimony concerning similarities be-
tween elements of computer programs, such as identical instructions345
or buried copyright notices and programmer's names, 346 a fact finder's
analysis of substantial similarity of two programs would be based solely
on a response to the functions and output of the programs. This analyti-
cal process is flawed in two respects.
First, the functions and output of a program are not protected as
literary works. 347 Two completely different programs can produce the
same screen outputs and results.348 Therefore, evidence of similar screen
outputs and functions alone is not sufficient to establish substantial simi-
larity between two programs.349
Second, some computer programs merely analyze data and produce
little or no output. When two programs produce little output, the lack of
visible results may render difficult a lay observer's analysis of substantial
similarity. For example, a program which calculates the total scores for
300 students, the mean of all the total scores and sorts the students by
total score, will produce an output that has little or no difference from
the output of any other program which performs the same test. How-
ever, some programming techniques may perform this task faster and
more efficiently than other techniques.350 Similarly, some file structures
may store information in such a way that the data is easier to access than
when it is stored in other file structures.51 Without expert testimony, an
345. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 752 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
346. See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876 n.6 (3d Cir. 1982). See
also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (system programmer's name was buried in source code of
defendant's program). See supra note 144.
347. Functions are not protectible under copyright law because, under the Whelan analysis,
they are the idea of the program. Screen outputs are protected as audiovisual works. See
Midway, 564 F. Supp. 741.
348. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., infra note 374 and accompanying text.
351. A sequential access file stores data in a contiguous block on a storage medium such as
a hard disk or magnetic tape. To retrieve an item of data from a sequential access file, a
program must begin at the first data entry, and examine each item until the desired data entry
is found. N. HAMPSHIRE, LIBRARY OF PET SUBROUTINES 111 (1982).
A random access file is the most useful form of storing data on a disk. A random access
file is actually two files. The first file, a data file, holds the data in non-contiguous memory
locations. The second file is an index file which holds the memory location and a keyword for
each data entry. For example, an employment record might contain a name, street address,
city, state, zip code, previous employment and schools attended. The index file would use the
name as the keyword. Each entry in the index file would contain the employee's name and the
November 1987]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
ordinary lay observer would be unable to evaluate similarities or differ-
ences in these types of programming techniques. The lay observer's re-
sponse would be based solely on similarities between two lists of students
and their total scores.
In contrast, the single, integrated substantial similarity test which
the Third Circuit applied in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Labora-
tory352 admits both lay and expert testimony. This sensible approach to
analysis of substantial similarity in computer programs provides the fact
finder with critical facts concerning highly technical elements of the pro-
grams that are not readily ascertainable by the ordinary lay observer.
Without these facts, it would be difficult to establish similarity of com-
puter programs based on the ordinary lay observer's response to a pro-
gram's screen outputs and results.
C. Idea/Expression Dichotomy Based on the Purpose
or Function of a Program
Copyright law protects the expression of ideas, not the ideas them-
selves.35 3 Therefore, before a fact finder can compare the expressions of
two computer programs, he or she must first distinguish the idea from
the expression.35 4 In copyright infringement actions concerning com-
puter programs, the idea/expression dichotomy should be performed in a
two-part test. First, the idea of a computer program should be distin-
guished from the expression based on the particular purpose or function
of the program. Second, both the ideas and the expressions must be com-
pared to establish substantial similarity. 5
The court in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory35 6 dis-
tinguished idea from expression by defining the program's idea as the
purpose or function of a utilitarian work, and the expression as the ele-
ments of the program which are not necessary to that purpose or func-
tion 7.35  Further, the court held that when the purpose of the program is
to accomplish a specific result in a specific manner, the structure of the
program may be essential to accomplishing the purpose.3 5 ' For example,
location on the disk where the other data is stored in the data file. Id. at 120. See supra note
20 for a discussion of Random Access Memory (RAM).
352. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
353. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of this two-step analysis.
356. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
357. Id. at 1236. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
358. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1238 n.34 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987). See supra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
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a program that produces a screen which is based on a standardized form
and conveys standardized information will have a limited number of
structures available for the sequencing and organization of informa-
tion.359 This can be contrasted to Whelan, where evidence existed of
other computer programs which performed the same function-aiding
the business of a dental laboratory-yet had dissimilar structures.360 As
a result, the Whelan court concluded that Rand Jaslow was not limited
in his choice of available structures for his computer programs.361
A court should also examine the idea of a program to determine
whether its purpose is to perform a specific function in a specific manner.
The Whelan court stated that if this threshold test is satisfied, then the
structure, sequence and organization of a program will be indispensable
to the program's idea, and therefore will not be protected by copyright
law.362 Consequently, copying of such a program's structure would not
constitute copyright infringement. If the idea of a program is not the
performance of a specific function in a specific manner, then the pro-
gram's structure will be given copyright protection. Copying of this
structure would be grounds for a copyright infringement action.
After a court delineates idea from expression in a program, the
court must examine the similarities between the two expressions.363 The
Whelan court properly admitted evidence of similarities of file structure,
screen outputs and five subroutines. 3" As each of these elements is part
of the organizational structure of a program, similarity of these elements
indicates a similarity of organizational structure.
Although each of these elements of computer programming expres-
sion alone may not be sufficient to establish substantial similarity,365 they
359. Plains Cotton Cooperative Assoc. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th
Cir.), reh'g denied, 813 F.2d 407 (1987). In Plains, the Fifth Circuit denied plaintiff's applica-
tion for a preliminary injunction to prevent defendant from marketing, distributing and other-
wise using software allegedly copied from plaintiff. Id. at 1264. Defendant hired four of
plaintiff's former employees in order to write a program similar to plaintiff's program, but for
use on a different computer. Id. at 1258. Although defendant's program "[was] very similar
to [plaintiff's program] on the functional specification, programming and documentation
levels," the four employees denied copying plaintiff's program and claimed that they had
drawn on their "expertise in copyright programming and design gained over a number of
years." Id. at 1259. Based on expert testimony, the court held that insufficient evidence ex-
isted to support a finding of copying the organizational structure of plaintiff's program. Id. at
1260-61.
360. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
361. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238.
362. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238-39.
363. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 306-13 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 310.
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are indicia of similarity between the organizational structures of two pro-
grams. Therefore, a court should consider these elements when consider-
ing substantial similarity of expression. For example, evidence that two
programs contain five substantially similar subroutines which perform
the important tasks of each program may not be sufficient to establish
copyright infringement. Instead, a court should weigh the importance of
each subroutine to the functioning of the program when analyzing sub-
stantial similarity. The greater the importance of the similar subroutines,
the greater the likelihood of copyright infringement.
In contrast to these indicia of copyright infringement, other ele-
ments of expression exist in computer programs which, despite exact du-
plication, do not indicate similarity between program structures.
Instead, only the methods used to link these elements to the other ele-
ments of two programs should be compared to establish copyright in-
fringement. These elements are programming scenes a faire.366 In this
Note, "programming scenes a faire" are defined as programming styles
and techniques or general routines which are as a practical matter indis-
pensable or standard when developing a program to perform a certain
purpose. Programming scenes a faire should not be considered copy-
rightable expression. 67 Programming scenes afaire include programs in
the public domain and common complex programming structures which
may not be copyrighted.
Public domain software is software that is public property and may
be used without compensation to the author.368 Public domain software
differs from most public domain literary works because public domain
software may be copyrighted. However, although some of these pro-
grams may be copyrighted, the author grants a license to the public to
freely use the work.36 9 Commercial use of copyrighted public software is
then reserved to the author.370 Thousands of copyrighted and un-
copyrighted public domain programs are available.37' Irrespective of
366. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of scenes a faire.
367. In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245 (3d. Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984), the Third Circuit stated that copyright protection
will not extend to expression in a program which is dictated by the underlying idea. Id. at
1253. Although the court did not define these elements as programming scenes a faire, the
court held that when few ways of expressing an idea in a computer program are available, idea
and expression will merge and the expression will not be copyrightable. Id.
368. R. FROEHLICH, THE IBM PC (AND COMPATIBLES) FREE SOFTWARE CATALOG AND
DIRECTORY 3 (1986).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. See R. FROEHLICH, supra note 368 for a catalog of over 625 disk volumes and over
12,000 disk files of free software.
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whether public domain software is copyrighted, when it is included in a
copyrighted program, the expression of the program which owes its ori-
gin to the public domain software is not considered part of the protected
expression.372 Original work is limited to work created by the author.
3 73
Therefore, a programmer who includes public domain software in his or
her program may not claim copyright protection for any portion of the
program created by another author. Furthermore, when a court evalu-
ates substantial similarity between computer programs, the elements of
the program which owe their origin to public domain software must be
considered uncopyrightable expression. As such, they are programming
scenes a faire.
A second example of programming scenes a faire is common, com-
plex programming structures. Common, complex programming struc-
tures are common routines that have been developed and refined and are
well-known to computer programmers. Some of the best examples of
common, complex programming techniques are sorting routines. Sorting
routines order data, e.g. alphabetically.374 The commonality of these
routines renders their expression in a computer program uncopyright-
able. To give an author a copyright in common, complex programming
structures would grant a monoploy over commonplace ideas.375
In summary, public domain software and common, complex pro-
gramming structures are stock programming expressions which cannot
be copyrighted without granting a monopoly over standardized expres-
sion to the author. Just as a court should not consider scenes a faire as
part of the copyrightable expression of a play or novel, programming
scenes a faire should not be considered as part of the expression of a
computer program.
The Third Circuit's evaluation of substantial similarity between the
two programs based on similarities among the file structures, screen out-
puts and subroutines ignores the impact of uncopyrightable expression in
372. 1 NIMMER, supra note 31, § 2.01[A]. Only original works of authorship may be pro-
tected under the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). See Roth Greeting Cards v.
United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970) and Leeds Music, Ltd. v. Robin, 358 F. Supp.
650 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
373. 1 NIMMER, supra note 31, § 2.01[A].
374. Some common examples of sorting routines are: Bubblesort, Quicksort, Heapsort and
Bucketsorts. S. BAASE, COMPUTER ALGORITHMS: INTRODUCTION TO DESIGN AND ANALY-
sis 52-78 (1978). A Bubblesort is a straightforward search which bubbles the smallest (or
largest) data item to the top. Id. at 52. A Quicksort sorts data faster than a Bubblesort, yet it
uses more computer memory. Id. at 58. Therefore, although using a Quicksort will produce an
ordered list of data elements faster than a Bubblesort, if the computer's memory is limited, it
may be necessary to use a Bubblesort.
375. See supra note 93.
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computer programs. The Whelan court did not have to consider pro-
gramming scenes a faire when it evaluated substantial similarity between
file structures, screen output and subroutines. The evidence presented by
Whelan's expert, Dr. Moore, did not address public domain software or
common, complex programming structures.37 6 However, in the future,
programming scenes a faire may contribute significantly to two similar
programs. For example, two programs could possibly be completely cre-
ated using common, complex programming structures which are consid-
ered programming scenes a faire. In this case, a court should not
consider similarities of programming scenes a faire in a second program
as indicia of copyright infringement of the first program. Instead, a court
should examine the method each program uses to link together the pro-
gramming scenes a faire. This linking method is also part of the organi-
zational structure of a program. If, based on expert testimony, a court
finds that the linking methods of the programs are substantially similar, a
court should find that the structure of the second program has infringed
the former. However, if a court finds that the structures are not substan-
tially similar, each programmer's original expression-the method he or
she used to link together the programming scenes a faire-should be
protected.
A program which solely uses programming scenes a faire illustrates
the nejed for courts to extend copyright protection. Courts must expand
their analysis beyond delineation of idea and expression based on the
function of a program, and consider the impact of common program-
ming scenes a faire between two programs. Only when programming
scenes afaire are no longer considered as indicia of substantial similarity
will copyright protection be limited to the author's original expression.
If a court fails to analyze programming scenes a faire as uncopyrightable
expression, it may grant copyright protection to elements which are not
part of the author's original work, thus depriving the public of expression
which is public property.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Protection for Computer Program Structure
Copyright protection for computer programs should not be limited
to the literal elements of a program, the source and object code. The
Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
376. See Whelan Assoes. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1316, 1320-22
(E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987) for Dr.
Moore's testimony.
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Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies."'3 77 Further, copyright law fosters creativity by assuring authors of
original works that they will receive the "exclusive benefits of whatever
commercial success his or her work enjoys . ,,378 Authors will be
further encouraged to create new works if copyright protection is ex-
tended to the nonliteral elements of a program.
A computer program can perform a particular function in many dif-
ferent ways. Each programmer who creates a program which causes,
organizes and sequences the data and programming elements in an origi-
nal manner must receive the exclusive benefits of his or her work.3 79
Limiting copyright protection in computer programs to the literal ele-
ments would only encourage creativity in new source and object codes.
In contrast, copyright protection for a program's structure, sequence and
organization would provide further incentive for programmers to create
new methods of interaction between the elements of the program.
B. A Single, Integrated Substantial Similarity Test
The average lay observer cannot easily understand computer pro-
grams.380 This handicaps an ordinary lay observer's ability to evaluate
similarities between the expression of two computer programs. There-
fore, the ordinary lay observer's response to similarities is imprecise for
determining copyright infringement of a computer program.
A single, integrated substantial similarity test allows the ordinary
lay observer to make a precise decision on similarities between computer
programs. With the assistance of expert testimony, a fact finder can ac-
curately compare and assess the similarities between two highly technical
works. Thus, the inherent, highly technical nature of computer pro-
grams mandates that courts admit both lay and expert testimony through
a single, integrated test in copyright infringement actions involving com-
puter programs.
C. Idea/Expression Dichotomy Based on the Purpose
or Function of a Program
The purpose of copyright law is to foster creativity without depriv-
ing the public of ideas which may only be expressed in a limited number
377. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
378. Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983).
379. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
380. See supra note 127 and accompanying text for a discussion of the technical nature of
computer programs and the response of the ordinary observer.
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of different ways.38' However, the highly technical nature of computer
programs renders difficult the delineation of idea and expression.38
The Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory383 court's bifur-
cation of idea and expression based on the purpose or function of a pro-
gram provides a pragmatic method for determining the expression of a
program. This test allows programmers to benefit from copyright pro-
tection for non-literal program elements. The test also allows program-
mers to receive the benefits of their work if the program they create may
be expressed through different structures. In contrast, if the available
methods of expressing a program's function are limited, a program's
structure will not be copyrightable. The purpose of copyright law is to
balance a programmer's interest in reaping the benefits of his or her work
with the public's interest in ideas which may only be expressed in a lim-
ited number of ways.384 The Whelan test achieves this purpose by giving
authors the economic benefit of their copyrightable works without de-
priving the public of nonprotectible expression.
D. Substantial Similarity and Programming Scenes a Faire
When determining substantial similarity between two programs,
courts should consider all similar copyrightable expression as indicia of
similarity of organizational structure. Although these elements alone
may not be sufficient to establish substantial similarity, they serve as pro-
bative evidence of similarity between the underlying structures of the
programs. In contrast, programming scenes a faire are elements of ex-
pression which should not be considered indicia of substantial similarity
of structures. Programming scenes a faire should be considered un-
copyrightable expression. Accordingly, the presence of identical pro-
gramming scenes a faire should not influence a court's analysis of
substantial similarity. Instead, to protect an author's original work, a
court should limit its evaluation of evidence to the method used to link
programming scenes afaire. This analysis would provide an incentive to
programmers to create new programs which organize programming
scenes afaire into new structures, while allowing uncopyrightable expres-
sions to remain public property.
381. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purpose of copy-
right law.
382. See supra notes 78 and 141 and accompanying text.
383. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
384. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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E. Summary
The Third Circuit's decision in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory3 85 expanded copyright protection for computer programs be-
yond the source and object codes, to the structure, sequence and organi-
zation of the program. The court held that the appropriate test of
substantial similarity between computer programs is a single, integrated
test which admits both lay and expert testimony. Finally, the court for-
mulated a new idea/expression dichotomy which examines the purpose
or function of the program to establish the idea. While the Third Cir-
cuit's opinion is a strong step in providing greater incentives for com-
puter programmers, the court's ruling fails to recognize programming
scenes a faire as elements of a computer program which must be defined
as uncopyrightable expression.
This Note proposes an additional requirement to the Whelan dichot-
omy of idea and expression. The addition of the programming scenes a
faire requirement will restrict the definition of expression in computer
programs to the copyrightable elements. Use of the Whelan test in com-
bination with the programming scenes a faire requirement will provide
computer programmers with a stronger incentive to create and develop
new programs.
Suzanne R. Jones
385. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
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